Memory Corruption Attacks Against Intel SGX Shielded Software - Invited Talk

Autor(en):

Davi, Lucas

Name der Veranstaltung:

CASES: Special Session - Towards Secure Computer Architecture: Understanding Security Vulnerabilities and Emerging Attacks for Better Defenses

Ort:

Torino

Datum:

03.10.2018

Abstract

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a recent hardware-based trusted execution environment that provides strong isolation of security-critical code and data by allocating them in dedicated, encrypted memory regions called enclaves. Until today, the threat of memory corruption attacks such as return-oriented programming and its impact on SGX protected program code and data is not yet well understood. In this talk, we provide an in-depth investigation of the Intel SGX internals regarding how untrusted host applications interact with trusted enclaves. Based on this analysis, we present novel memory corruption techniques allowing an attacker to undermine SGX to steal private information or bypass remote attestation protocols.