Art der Publikation: Beitrag in Sammelwerk

SALSA: SGX Attestation for Live Streaming Applications

Autor(en):

Cloosters, Tobias; Surminski, Sebastian; Sangel, Gerrit; Davi, Lucas

Titel des Sammelbands:

Proc. of 7th IEEE Secure Development Conference (SecDev)

Verlag:

IEEE

Veröffentlichung:

2022

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):

doi:10.1109/SecDev53368.2022.00019

Link zum Volltext:

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9973040

Zitation:

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Kurzfassung

Intel SGX is a security feature of processors that allows running software in enclaves, isolated from the operating system. Even an attacker with full control of the computer system cannot inspect these enclaves. This makes SGX enclaves an
adequate solution to store and process highly sensitive data like encryption keys. However, these enclaves are still vulnerable to standard software attacks. While SGX allows static attestation, i.e., validating the integrity of the program code and data in the enclave, static attestation cannot detect run-time attacks.
We present SALSA , the first solution to allow run-time attestation of SGX enclaves. To show its applicability, we use SALSA to implement a video streaming service that uses an SGX enclave to decode the video stream. When a compromise of the SGX enclave is detected, the streaming of the video instantaneously stops. This shows a practical use-case for runtime attestation of SGX enclaves. In the evaluation, we show that the performance of this setup is sufficient to attest a live video streaming service.