Art der Publikation: Beitrag in Sammelwerk

Privilege Escalation Attacks on Android

Autor(en):

Davi, Lucas; Dmitrienko, Alexandra; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza; Winandy, Marcel

Titel des Sammelbands:

Proc. of 13th Information Security Conference (ISC)

Veröffentlichung:

2010

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-18178-8_30

Zitation:

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Kurzfassung

Android is a modern and popular software platform for smartphones. Among its predominant features is an advanced security model which is based on application-oriented mandatory access control and sandboxing. This allows developers and users to restrict the execution of an application to the privileges it has (mandatorily) assigned at installation time. The exploitation of vulnerabilities in program code is hence believed to be confined within the privilege boundaries of an application’s sandbox. However, in this paper we show that a privilege escalation attack is possible. We show that a genuine application exploited at runtime or a malicious application can escalate granted permissions. Our results immediately imply that Android’s security model cannot deal with a transitive permission usage attack and Android’s sandbox model fails as a last resort against malware and sophisticated runtime attacks.