Art der Publikation: Beitrag in Sammelwerk

Just-In-Time Code Reuse: On the Effectiveness of Fine-Grained Address Space Layout Randomization - Best Student Paper Award

Autor(en):

Snow, Kevin; Davi, Lucas; Dmitrienko, Alexandra; Liebchen, Christopher; Monrose, Fabian; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza

Titel des Sammelbands:

Proc. of 34th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland)

Veröffentlichung:

2013

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):

doi:10.1109/SP.2013.45

Link zum Volltext:

https://www.trust.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Group_TRUST/PubsPDF/jit-rop.pdf

Zitation:

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Kurzfassung

Fine-grained address space layout randomization (ASLR) has recently been proposed as a method of efficiently mitigating runtime attacks. In this paper, we introduce the design and implementation of a framework based on a novel attack strategy, dubbed just-in-time code reuse, that undermines the benefits of fine-grained ASLR. Specifically, we derail the assumptions embodied in fine-grained ASLR by exploiting the ability to repeatedly abuse a memory disclosure to map an application’s memory layout on-the-fly, dynamically discover API functions and gadgets, and JIT-compile a target program using those gadgets - all within a script environment at the time an exploit is launched. We demonstrate the power of our framework by using it in conjunction with a real-world exploit against Internet Explorer, and also provide extensive evaluations that demonstrate the practicality of just-in-time code reuse attacks. Our findings suggest that fine-grained ASLR may not be as promising as first thought.